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The Second International Workshop on Logic, Rationality and Interaction
(LORI-II) took place in Chongqing, China on October 8–11, 2009.1 The
workshop featured a distinguished roster of invited speakers, refereed con-
tributed papers and posters, and tutorial sessions, as well as cultural events
and excursions (see http://loriweb.org/lori2009 for more information about the
event). Researchers from across the world and different academic disciplines
gathered in Chongqing to exchange ideas and explore new contacts between
logic, mathematics, philosophy, computer science, linguistics and cognitive
science. The articles in this special issue were selected from among the papers
presented at the workshop [1] and the LogICCC2 meeting held on October
7th, 2009 in Chongqing. Each of these papers were extensively revised and
extended after a second round of reviews. The result is a collection of papers
that provides a glimpse of the many different ideas and high-quality discussions
found at LORI-II.
The first paper is “Towards a Dynamic Logic of Questions” by Johan van
Benthem and S¸tefan Minica˘. This paper contributes to the growing literature
on logical models of questions. Van Benthem and Minica˘ develop a dynamic
epistemic logic where questions are first-class citizens. The underlying models
are based on the standard semantic interpretation of questions as partitions
over a set of states. Epistemic models are extended with such a relation which
1By now there has already been a third LORI workshop. See http://golori.org for information on
the LORI workshop series which takes place at various locations in China every two years.
2LogICCC was a Eurocores project that funded research projects focused on logic in the
Humanities, Social and Computational Sciences.
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is intended to represent the current “issue” to be resolved. Questions are then
viewed as “triggers for explicit events of issue management”. They provide a
complete logic for the actions of raising, refining and resolving an issue.
Denis Bonnay and Dag Westerståhl offer a new perspective on a classic
problem in the philosophy of logic in their paper “Consequence Mining:
Constants versus Consequence Relations”. Bolzano initiated a program of
extracting a consequence relation from truth preservation patterns under
replacement given a fixed set of distinguished constants [2]. Bonnay and
Westerståhl propose an inverse to this construction. They start with a conse-
quence relation and extract a set of logical constants. They find conditions that
ensure there is a Galois connection between (ordered) sets of consequence
relations and sets of sets of constants (ordered by inclusion).
The next paper contributes to the classic theory of belief revision initiated
by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [3]. In “A General Family of
Preferential Belief Removal Operators”, Richard Booth, Thomas Meyer and
Chattrakul Sombattheera study a general framework for reasoning about
belief removal. The central idea is to use two relations when modeling belief
change: an ordering x < y which is intended to mean “world x is strict more
plausible than y” and a second ordering x ≺ y which is intended to mean “the
agent has an explicit reason to hold x more plausible than y”. They study
the situation when the underlying orderings are not necessarily complete, al-
lowing incomparibilities between worlds. The resulting class of belief removal
functions is axiomatized and they show that it includes an important family of
removal functions based on finite prioritized belief bases.
Robert Aumann proved a fascinating theorem in 1976 [4]: Suppose that
n agents share a common prior and have different private information. If
there is common knowledge in the group of the posterior probabilities, then
the posteriors must be equal (the agents cannot agree to disagree). Cédric
Dégremont and Olivier Roy generalize this seminal result in their pa-
per “Agreement Theorems in Dynamic-Epistemic Logic”. They develop a
framework for reasoning about such “agreement theorems” using epistemic-
plausibility models. Studying Aumann’s theorem in this context raises a num-
ber of interesting technical questions (eg., common priors is not expressible in
the language commonly used to reason about epistemic-plausibility models).
An appropriate modal logic is defined and used to formally derive Aumann’s
original theorem. Their main contribution is to initiate the study of dynamic
agreement results on epistemic-plausibility models, providing a new form of
agreements via the operation of public announcement.
Finally, Ming Xu continues his work using the STIT-framework [5] to reason
about actions in “Actions as Events”. Xu starts by developing a theory of
“token” actions based on his notion of an event in a branching time model. A
simple theory of event composition is developed. This basic theory of events,
actions and event composition is then used to define various kinds of group
actions, ranging from instantaneous group actions to sequential group actions.
An extended STIT-theory of agency is proposed where STIT-operators are
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combined with explicit action descriptions. Xu discusses a number of fascinat-
ing technical and conceptual issues that arise in this setting.
I would like to thank the reviewers for their hard work and the authors for
their patience during such a long editorial process.
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